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This study was conducted to determine if reductions in water deliveries to farmers in the 
San Joaquin Valley due to enforcement of the Endangered Species Act has resulted in a 
compensable Fifth Amendment taking of property.  A case study of the California Water Crisis is 
examined.  The subject of this case study is the Westlands Water District. 
 The details of the California Water Crisis were outlined.  The necessary elements of a 
takings investigation were identified for the case study.  These elements were applied to takings 
criteria that has been established by the courts.  Using prior court rulings as a guide to apply the 
criteria, it was determined that a taking of property has not occurred.  
Alternatives to compensation for a taking of property that would provide relief to farmers 
affected by the California Water Crisis are discussed.  Ensuring long-term reliability of the 
state’s water supply requires Endangered Species Act reform and improvements to water storage 
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In 1922, the Supreme Court ruled in the case of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon that “if 
regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking” of property, thus creating the doctrine of 
regulatory takings (Pennsylvania Coal 1922).  It was found that a state law requiring a mining 
company to leave a certain amount of coal in the ground to prevent surface subsidence had such 
an impact on the use of the property that it had the effect a taking of property.  Before this case, a 
taking was only considered to be the seizure of property and all the included rights to the use of 
the property, as in instances of eminent domain.  After the ruling in the Pennsylvania Coal case, 
any regulation that interferes with the ability of an individual to use his or her property could 
potentially constitute a taking.   
Because of this doctrine of regulatory takings, many challenges have been brought by 
property owners claiming that regulations restricting the use of property have resulted in a 
regulatory taking of private property.   Such a taking of property would necessitate compensation 
under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.  Subsequent rulings by the court have 
attempted to clarify the regulatory takings doctrine and when a regulation “goes too far” by 
creating tests to determine if certain conditions are satisfied to constitute a taking of property 
(Mandelker et al. 2008).   
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The courts have established criteria for what constitutes a taking.  The Supreme Court has 
expressed that the determination of a regulatory taking should be on the basis of “ad hoc, factual 
inquiries” (Penn Central 1978).  Although there is a set of guidelines to determine if a taking has 
occurred, ad hoc inquiries require a case by case evaluation of the facts, which has led to a 
tremendous number of lawsuits alleging regulatory takings.  One of the most common areas in 
which regulatory takings have been alleged is land use.  Many land owners have claimed that 
regulations, particularly environmental regulations, have so restricted their ability to use the land 
that a compensable taking has occurred. 
Since the enactment of the Endangered Species Act (ESA) in 1973, landowners have 
been subject to the stringent rules required in the name of species preservation.  The ability of a 
property owner to use his or her land may be greatly restricted if such use might harm a protected 
species.  Examples of uses that have been restricted because of the ESA include the development 
of homes, harvesting lumber, or growing agricultural crops.  Many landowners have brought 
lawsuits claiming such restrictions on the use of their property constitute a taking, which would 
require compensation.  For the most part, these scenarios would result from a physical 
occupation of property by a species, where a protected species inhabits that property, or it is 
designated as critical habitat.  However, there may be instances where the use of property has 
been affected, but there is no species within many miles of the property.   
In California, a complex system of water projects delivers water from the north to users 
in the San Joaquin Valley and southern California.  Water flows through a network of reservoirs 
and rivers to the Sacramento-San Joaquin River Delta, where it is pumped out by massive 
pumping stations and sent south through a system of canals.  Agriculture in the San Joaquin 
Valley utilizes this water for irrigation, which has allowed the region to become the most 
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productive agricultural region in the nation.  This region has suffered tremendously in recent 
years from cutbacks in water deliveries to farmers.  Hundreds of thousands of acres of farmland 
have gone fallow, tens of thousands of farm workers are unemployed, and the region as a whole 
has suffered huge economic losses, all in the name of preserving a fish called the Delta smelt 
(Campbell 2007).  Without water to irrigate their crops, many farmers have lost all ability to 
economically use their land.  Because of the inflexible nature of the ESA, the fish has been given 
priority over the people of the San Joaquin Valley.  In such a tragic situation, one must wonder 




Does enforcement of the Endangered Species Act and its subsequent impact on the use of 




The reductions in water deliveries from the Sacramento-San Joaquin River Delta due to 
enforcement of the Endangered Species Act will have such an effect on property that it will 









1) To identify the critical elements required for a taking of property in a case study of the 
California Water Crisis. 
2) To apply the standards of the Supreme Court tests to the case study. 
3) To determine whether a compensable taking of property has occurred according to the 




 California is the nation’s leading agriculture state, with an industry valued at $32 billion 
in 2005 (CDFA 2007).  That year, the state’s 76,500 farms and ranches accounted for 13.3% of 
the nation’s total agricultural value.  California produces more fruits and vegetables than any 
other state in the nation, and some crops are only grown in California.  The San Joaquin Valley is 
comprised of eight counties, yet is home to seven of the ten most productive agriculture counties 
in California, including Fresno County, the most productive agricultural county in the nation.  
Agricultural employment accounts for over 13% of all employment in the region, and well over 
20% in some counties (Umbach 2005).  Over 170,000 jobs in the San Joaquin Valley are credited 
to the agriculture industry.  The economic viability of rural communities in the San Joaquin 
Valley is directly related to the agricultural economy of the region. 
 The agricultural industry of this region is dependent upon irrigation water provided in 
part by the Bureau of Reclamation (USBR) through the federal Central Valley Project (CVP) and 
the California Department of Water Resources (DWR) through the State Water Project (SWP).  
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Cut-backs in water deliveries from the CVP and SWP have caused widespread economic 
devastation in the region.  Hundreds of thousands of acres of farmland have been left idle, unable 
to produce a crop due to lack of water.  Reports from five of the eight counties have estimated 
over 500,000 acres of farmland have been fallowed, and losses of $1.4 billion (Miller 2009).  
With no crops to tend to, tens of thousands of farm workers are unemployed.  A University of 
California study estimated as many as eighty thousand jobs have been lost due to this crisis 
(Pollack 2009).  Unemployment in some rural communities is forty percent, and many of the 
workers who used to harvest crops in the most productive agriculture region in the world now 
stand in food lines (Grossi and Rodriguez 2009).  Continued viability of this region’s most 
important industry is uncertain at best as long as water deliveries are restricted. 
 The remedy much desired by the farmers and farm workers of the San Joaquin Valley is 
to turn the pumps on and deliver water to the farms so they can continue to grow crops and make 
a living.  Until that time comes, the economic devastation, the unemployment, the food lines, and 
the loss of production will continue.  However, the Fifth Amendment requires just compensation 
to be paid whenever property is taken by the government.  If the result of the government actions 
causing the reductions in water deliveries is found to be a taking of property, then the deprived 
property owners are entitled to financial relief.  Though not ideal, temporary relief of this nature 
may provide farmers with the financial cushion necessary to weather the storm and allow them to 
continue to farm once the water deliveries are restored.  
This project will examine a case study of the California Water Crisis, identifying relevant 
facts of the case and applying those facts to takings requirements identified by the courts.  It will 
focus on agricultural users in the San Joaquin Valley.  In doing so, one can make a reasonable 
determination of how the courts will rule in such a case, and if it is worthwhile for affected 
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parties to seek compensation from the government through an inverse condemnation claim.  
Once the details of this case have been examined, a recommendation will be made regarding 
whether or not a takings claim should be pursued, or if alternative courses of action are available 


























REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
 
Fifth Amendment Takings 
 
 The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution reads in part: “No person shall be 
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be 
taken for public use, without just compensation” (Mandelker et al. 2008).  These phrases are 
known as the “Due Process Clause” and the “Takings Clause,” respectively.  The Bill of Rights 
places a great deal of restrictions on the government in order to protect the rights of individuals.  
However, neither of these clauses are an absolute restriction on the government’s power, as is the 
case in other clauses of the Constitution.  For instance, the First Amendment expressly prohibits 
the government from abridging the freedom of speech.  On the other hand, the Due Process and 
Takings Clauses of the Fifth Amendment do not expressly prohibit any government action; 
rather these clauses mandate obligations of the government if such actions are carried out 
(Mandelker et al. 2008).   
Mandelker et al. (2008) identify two powers which the government possesses: the police 
power and the power of eminent domain.  The police power is the authority of the government to 
pass and enforce laws and regulations to protect the public health, safety, morals, or general 
welfare.  The Due Process Clause requires a certain established procedure to be followed when 
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the government passes and enforces laws that might deprive a person of life, liberty, or property.  
An example would be a law that prohibits theft.  Before such a law was established, it went 
through the proper procedures required by the legislature in order to be passed.  If an individual 
violates this law by stealing something, this person is not simply thrown in jail, which is to 
deprive him of his liberties; he must first be accused of the crime, tried in court, and found guilty 
by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.   
Eminent domain is the power to take private property for public use.  This makes it 
possible for the government to acquire property, usually land, in an effort to establish public 
facilities.  Public schools, post offices, military bases, and freeways often require the government 
to exercise its power of eminent domain in order to construct these projects.  The process of 
condemnation must be followed before the government can gain title to the property and put it to 
a public use.  When this happens, the government must pay just compensation to the previous 
owner of the property.  This is mandated by the Takings Clause.  Taking private property without 
following due process or paying just compensation would be unconstitutional (Mandelker et al. 
2008). 
Within the Takings Clause there are several terms that have been interpreted by the courts 
in such a way that it has caused the general understanding of the clause to change from its literal 
interpretation.  These terms are: “just compensation,” “public use,” “property,” and “taken.”  
This project does not intend to argue the merits of these interpretations, but an understanding of 
how these terms are understood by the courts is important.   
Just compensation is perhaps the least controversial of these terms.  The idea behind just 
compensation is best described by the Supreme Court opinion in the case Armstrong v. United 
States (1960), which expresses that “the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee [is] designed to bar 
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Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and 
justice, should be borne by the public as a whole” (Noel 1987).  It has long been accepted that, in 
the case of acquiring a parcel of land through eminent domain, just compensation is the fair 
market value of the property in question.  This is to serve the same effect as if another private 
party had purchased the property from the previous owner, so as to not leave that person in a 
disadvantaged position due to the property being taken for public use.     
Public use in its most literal sense means “to be used by the public.”  This is the case 
when land is acquired to build a government building or a public works project.  However, the 
courts have expanded the meaning of this term to be understood as “public purpose,” which 
would be to provide some public benefit (Wenar 1997).  The public purpose question has been 
visited several times by the Supreme Court.  Berman v. Parker (1954) and Kelo v. City of New 
London (2005) held that the government can acquire private property through its power of 
eminent domain and then provide that newly acquired property to private developers to promote 
economic revitalization in that area.  Similarly, in Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff (1984), 
the Supreme Court held that it served a public purpose to use eminent domain to acquire private 
property from large landowners and transfer title to longtime tenants of the land in an effort to 
reduce the concentration of land ownership in Hawaii.  In writing the opinion in this case, Justice 
O’Conner, referring to the Berman decision, stated: “where the exercise of the eminent domain 
power is rationally related to a conceivable public purpose, the Court has never held a 
compensated taking to be proscribed by the Public Use Clause…[I]t is only the taking’s purpose, 
and not its mechanics, that must pass scrutiny under the Public Use Clause” (Hawaii Housing 
Authority 1984).  Because the property is not required to be used by the public, property could be 
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taken for a variety of reasons, so long as it is rationally related to a conceivable public purpose 
and the owner of the property is compensated. 
The courts have come to understand property not as things, but as rights.  Eagle (2002) 
describes property as a set of rights.  What is called property is defined by an individual’s 
relationship to a particular thing, which can be explicit or abstract.  When an individual owns 
property, this person holds a set of rights that establish his or her relationship to a parcel of land, 
an automobile, or an idea.   
Among the crucial set of rights that make up property are exclusive possession, 
disposition, and use.  When Eagle (2002) speaks of exclusive possession, his implications are the 
holding of the set of rights in such a manner that no others may hold those rights.  In essence, to 
own property and hold a set of rights includes the ability to exclude others from those rights.  
The disposition of property means the forfeiture of rights.  This can take many shapes.  The 
example used by Eagle (2002) is “the right to invite others to share in his interests.”  The owner 
is giving up his right to exclude others from his property, albeit temporarily.  Another example 
would be the owner of a house burning it to the ground.  This is a forfeiture of the right to use the 
house, which in this case is a permanent forfeiture of rights because the thing that the owner 
holds the set of rights over (the house) is destroyed, thus severing the relationship the owner 
once had with the house.   
The use is inherently important, and would include the enjoyment of the property for a 
variety of purposes.  The economic development of the property is an essential use that creates a 
measurable value.  Other uses can create value that may be intrinsic, such as open space or a 
natural landscape when considering land, or the value one places on a family heirloom.  
Ultimately, the value of property is derived from its use.  One is free to use and enjoy one’s own 
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property in any manner one sees fit, so long as it does not create a public nuisance or infringe 
upon another’s ability to use and enjoy his or her property.   If a conflict arises, it can be settled 
by the courts or by the police power of the government in the form of a regulation. 
At the heart of this discussion is the determination of what is a taking.  The acquisition of 
a parcel of land by the government is a taking, as is the case in many eminent domain 
proceedings.  Because the governmental use and the private use of that land cannot happen 
simultaneously, the government acquires the title and property rights associated with that land, 
making it possible to accomplish its purposes.  It has been demonstrated that the government 
does not have to maintain possession of the property, as is the case in many economic 
revitalization situations upheld by the Supreme Court.  However, just compensation in the form 
of the fair market value must be provided to make the previous owners whole.   
Prior to 1922, a taking of property was understood to be the seizure of property by the 
government for a public purpose, as described above.  However, the decision in Pennsylvania 
Coal Co. v. Mahon (1922) established that, in addition to eminent domain takings, the exercise 
of the government’s police power through regulations may affect property in such a way that a 
regulatory taking occurs.  The occupation of property and the restriction of the use of property 
resulting from a regulation are two such effects that the courts have determined may constitute 
takings (Mandelker et al. 2008). 
A permanent physical occupation will almost always result in a taking of property.  The 
Supreme Court ruled in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. (1982) that a “per se 
taking” was the result of a “permanent physical occupation” required by a New York statute 
(Loretto 1982).  The statute required landlords to allow cable companies to run cables across and 
attach cables to the apartment buildings the landlords owned.  Although the space occupied was 
12 
 
less than one-eighth of one cubic foot of the plaintiff’s building, it was ruled a taking.   This is 
because the property owner is required to forfeit his or her right to exclude others (the cable 
company) from his or her property, and has lost the ability to use that portion of the property.  
Justice Marshall found that the benefit to the public and the economic impact on the owner is not 
relevant in cases of occupation.  In this regard, the permanent physical occupation authorized by 
the statute would be equivalent to the government exercising the power of eminent domain and 
gaining title to the affected property because it infringes upon such essential rights of the owner 
of the property.  The government does not actually gain title to the property as it does in eminent 
domain cases, but the effect of a physical occupation is seen as the same as if that property had 
been condemned in an eminent domain proceeding (Loretto 1982).  
The type of taking at issue in the Pennsylvania Coal case has to do with the restriction of 
the use of property, as opposed to the occupation of it.  As discussed earlier, the government has 
the authority to regulate property through its police power.  However, lawsuits have been 
brought against nearly every level of government claiming that the restrictions placed on the use 
of property by regulations are so great that the regulation has had the same effect as the 
government taking the property through eminent domain.  It was this sort of excessive regulation 
that Justice Holmes was referring to in the Pennsylvania Coal opinion, when he said regulation 
that goes too far will be recognized as a taking.  It is not difficult to recognize when the 
government enacts the condemnation process to take property through eminent domain, nor is it 
particularly difficult to recognize a physical occupation of property, but determining whether a 
regulation goes too far is rather subjective, to say the least.  In the Supreme Court case of Penn 
Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York (1978), Justice Brennan admitted that the court 
had not developed any “set formula” to determine when it was required that property owners be 
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compensated for economic injuries caused by regulatory takings.  To assist in determining 
whether a regulation goes too far and a taking has occurred, the Supreme Court established a 
number of tests.  These tests are applied on a case-by-case basis and are meant to determine 
whether the facts of the case support the claim based on criteria set by the court (Penn Central 
1978). 
The decision in the Penn Central case created a balancing test that is widely accepted and 
used in takings jurisprudence.  The Penn Central test focuses on three main elements: the 
economic impact of the regulation, the interference with investment-backed expectations, and the 
character of the government action.  The economic impact has to do with the degree to which the 
regulation has restricted the ability of the owner to use his or her property for some economic 
return.  Investment-backed expectations have to do with the restriction of future uses that the 
property owner had intended to undertake.  Such uses might include the development of a parcel 
of land.  However, the property owner must demonstrate that a reasonable, meaningful effort to 
use the property in such a way.  This might include plans or permits for development that were 
frustrated by a new regulation (Eagle 2007).   
The underlying principle behind both the economic impact and investment-backed 
expectation requirements is that the use of property that was restricted or denied by the 
regulation would have been permissible if there was no restriction.  If the use of property would 
otherwise result in a nuisance, a regulation prohibiting that use would not be a taking because 
such a use would not be permissible in the first place.  Essentially, there is no right to use 
property in such a manner that creates a nuisance; thus the prohibition of that use cannot be a 
taking because no right to that use ever existed (Burling 2002).  The meaning and use of the 
“character of the government action” requirement is somewhat unclear.  Meltz (2005) considers 
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the “character” to be the intention of the action, and possibly the foreseeable or expected effects 
of the regulation.   
Another test was devised in Agins v. City of Tiburon (1980), consisting of two parts.  The 
court determined that a taking has occurred if the regulation “does not substantially advance 
legitimate state interests…or denies the owner economically viable use of his land” (Burling 
2002).  A clarification was made in regards to the first prong of the Agins test in the decision of 
Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. (2005).  Here, the Supreme Court determined that the 
“substantially advances” requirement does not derive from the Takings Clause, but the Due 
Process Clause (Lingle 2005).  The implication of this decision is that even if a regulation is 
legitimate in accordance with due process and all other procedural requirements, it may still 
constitute a taking of property.  The second prong of the Agins test, considering the economically 
viable use of property, aligns closely with the first two requirements of the Penn Central test: the 
economic impact and investment-backed expectation requirements.  All of these elements use the 
frustration of the economic value of the property as a way to measure the restriction of the right 
to use the property. 
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Commission (1992) used the economic consideration to 
determine that a categorical taking had occurred.  Justice Scalia wrote in the opinion of the court 
that “[the court has] found categorical treatment appropriate…where a regulation denies all 
economically beneficial or productive use of land” (Lucas 1992).  In this case, a regulation 
prohibited the development of property within a certain distance of the shoreline.  A previous 
regulation placed a boundary line on the ocean side of Lucas’s property.  After he purchased two 
parcels with the intention of building houses, the regulation was changed, placing the boundary 
line on the inland side of his property.  This placed the entirety of both parcels within the 
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restricted development zone.  Parcels with existing homes located adjacent to Lucas’s parcels 
within the restricted area were not affected because they had already been developed.  The effect 
of the regulation prohibited any development of Lucas’s land.  A state trial court concluded that 
the regulation left his land valueless.  Justice Scalia expressed that “when the owner of real 
property has been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of the 
common good, that is, to leave his property economically idle, he has suffered a taking” (Lucas 
1992).  The denial of one hundred percent of the economically beneficial or productive use of 
property will almost certainly be considered a taking, as noted by Burling (2002).   
Burling (2002) goes on to assert that when the restriction of all economically viable use 
of property is determined to be a categorical taking, no further inquiry is required.  There is no 
need to consider other elements required of the Penn Central or any other test; it is evident that 
the right of the owner to use that property has been completely denied.  This is congruent with 
the determination of a taking due to physical occupation.  A per se taking caused by a physical 
occupation of property and a categorical taking caused by the total prohibition of all 
economically beneficial use of the property need not be balanced with any other factors, and 
would require compensation.  
While a complete denial of the use of property will likely result in a categorical taking, 
denial of less than one hundred percent of the economically viable use will not.  However, this 
does not mean a taking of property has not occurred.  The court may find a partial taking by 
using the criteria set forth in the Penn Central balancing test.  The economic uses denied will be 
compared to those still available, considering the economic impact, investment-backed 
expectations, and character of the government action.  When a partial taking is being examined, 
the courts must consider the “parcel as a whole.”  The concept of the parcel as a whole was 
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implied in Justice Brennan’s Penn Central opinion, where he stated “‘Taking’ jurisprudence 
does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments…[the] Court focuses rather…on 
the…extent of the interference with rights in the parcel as a whole…” (Penn Central 1972).  
Medena (1992) observes that this requirement does not limit the inquiry to simply the affected 
portion of the property, but requires examination of all relevant property held by the owner.  For 
instance, if a landowner had a spread of one thousand acres, and was prohibited by regulation 
from developing a ten-acre shopping center, the court’s inquiry would cover all one thousand 
acres, not just the ten acres where development is prohibited.   
 In some cases, a regulation is enacted that impacts the use of property but is later 
amended or rescinded to allow for the use that was restricted while the original regulation was 
enforced.  The Supreme Court explored whether the Just Compensation Clause requires the 
government to pay for “temporary” regulatory takings in First English Evangelical Lutheran 
Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles (1987).  In this case, a county ordinance was 
enacted to prohibit construction in a flood-prone area, eliminating all use of the plaintiff’s 
property.  In his opinion for the Supreme Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that “invalidation 
of the ordinance without payment of fair value for the use of the property during [the affected] 
period of time would be a constitutionally insufficient remedy” (First English 1987).  Chief 
Justice Rehnquist determined that compensation is required from the moment a taking has 
occurred, and so long as such regulation continues to affect a taking.  The temporary nature of 
the regulation affects the amount of compensation required by the Constitution, rather than the 





Endangered Species Act 
 
 The Endangered Species Act (ESA) is one of the most rigid environmental laws in the 
United States.  Littleworth and Garner (2007) state that the purposes of the ESA are “to provide a 
means whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened species depend 
may be conserved” and “to provide a program for the conservation of such …species…” (16 
U.S.C. §1531(c)(1)).  In the case Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill (1978), the Supreme Court 
stated that the “plain intent of Congress…was to halt and reverse the trend toward species 
extinction, whatever the cost.”  To be “endangered” means a species is in danger of extinction 
throughout all or a significant portion of its range (16 U.S.C. §1532(6)), while “threatened” 
means a species is likely to become endangered within the foreseeable future throughout all or a 
significant portion of its range (16 U.S.C. §1532(20)) (Herson and Lucks 2008).   
 According to Littleworth and Garner (2007), the law prohibits any person from taking a 
listed species (16 U.S.C. §1538(a)(1)), which is defined broadly by the statute and other 
regulations.  This prohibition applies to private individuals and entities, as well as federal, state, 
and local governmental entities.  It is important that the term “taking” or “take” used in regards 
to the ESA not be confused with the term as it is used in regards to the Fifth Amendment.  The 
ESA defines “take” as “harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or 
attempt to engage in any such conduct” (16 U.S.C. §1532(19)).  Through regulation, the term 
“harm” has been defined to include “significant habitat modification or degradation where it 
actually kills or injures wildlife by significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns, 
including breeding, feeding and sheltering” (50 C.F.R. §17.3).  This definition of harm was 
affirmed by the Supreme Court in Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great 
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Oregon (1995).  The law requires a species’ critical habitat be designated once that species is 
listed.  “Critical habitat” is a formally designated specific geographic area that contains those 
physical or biological features essential to the conservation of a listed species and may require 
special management or protection (Herson and Lucks 2008).  Critical habitat does not have to be 
occupied by the species at the time of listing, but contains those characteristics desirable to the 
species.  The designation of critical habitat must be made on the basis of the best available 
scientific data, as well as probable economic and other impacts. 
 The level of protection varies slightly between endangered and threatened species, but, 
for the most part, once a species is listed in either category, it is given nearly absolute protection 
with limited exceptions.  The federal agencies charged with enforcement of the ESA are the U.S. 
Fish & Wildlife Service (USFWS) and the National Oceanographic & Atmospheric 
Administration Fisheries Service (NOAA Fisheries).  The USFWS is an agency in the 
Department of the Interior, and has jurisdiction and permitting authority under the ESA over 
terrestrial wildlife, freshwater fish, and some marine species.  NOAA Fisheries is an agency in 
the Department of Commerce, and has jurisdiction and permitting authority under the ESA over 
marine species, including anadromous fish species such as salmon and steelhead (Herson and 
Lucks 2008).   
 Section Seven of the ESA requires federal agencies to consult with USFWS or NOAA 
Fisheries to insure that an agency action is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of a 
listed species or result in the destruction or adverse modification of critical habitat (ESA 
§7(a)(2); 16 U.S.C. §1536(a)(2)) (Meltz 2005).  “Action” is defined by ESA regulations as all 
activities or programs of any kind authorized, funded, or carried out by federal agencies (50 
C.F.R. §402.02).  Among other things, an action may include the granting of licenses, contracts, 
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leases, easements, rights-of-way, permits, or grants-in-aid; or activities directly or indirectly 
causing modifications to the land, water, or air.  The United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit decision of Gifford-Pinchot Task Force v. United States Fish and Wildlife Service 
(2004) found that an action is likely to “jeopardize” the continued existence of a species if there 
is a reasonable expectation that the action will directly or indirectly appreciably reduce the 
likelihood of either the survival or recovery of a listed species (Littleworth and Garner 2007).  
This is a slight variation from the definition expressed in ESA regulation 50 C.F.R. §402.02.   
 The consultation process required by Section Seven may begin with an informal 
consultation between the action agency, the federal agency that plans to undertake a proposed 
action, and the consulting agency, USFWS or NOAA Fisheries.  The informal consultation 
determines whether or not a proposed action is likely to adversely affect listed species or critical 
habitat (50 C.F.R. §402.13(a)).  If both agencies agree that the proposed action is not likely to 
have an adverse affect, then no further consultation is required.  However, if it is determined that 
the proposed action is to likely have an adverse affect, a formal consultation is required (50 
C.F.R. §§402.14(a) and (b)) (Littleworth and Garner 2007).   
 At the conclusion of a formal consultation, the consulting agency issues a biological 
opinion that identifies the potential effects of the action agency’s proposed action on listed 
species or critical habitat (16 U.S.C. §1536(b)(3)(A)).  A “no jeopardy” opinion is issued if the 
consulting agency finds that the proposed action is not likely to jeopardize the continued 
existence, or destroy or adversely modify the critical habitat of a protected species (50 C.F.R. 
§402.14(h)(3)).  When a “jeopardy” opinion is issued, the consulting agency must include 
“reasonable and prudent alternatives” to the proposed action that would avoid the adverse effects 
identified in the formal consultation process (16 U.S.C. §1536(b)(3); 50 C.F.R. §402.14(h)(3)) 
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(Littleworth and Garner 2007).  The action agency may adopt one of the alternatives identified in 
the biological opinion and proceed with the project or activity in such a way that would not 
jeopardize the species (50 C.F.R. §402.15(a)). The biological opinion outlines the terms and 
conditions required for the execution of the proposed action, which may include measures to 
mitigate expected harms, as well as incidental take limits.  The incidental take limit allows for 
the taking of a protected species up to the number specified by the permit.  While the 
consultation process is underway, before a biological opinion is issued, action agencies are 
prohibited from making “irreversible or irretrievable” commitments of resources to the proposed 
action that has the effect of foreclosing the development of reasonable and prudent alternatives to 
the action (16 U.S.C. §1536(d)).  Littleworth and Garner (2007) maintain that this requirement is 
intended to allow the agency decision making process to remain flexible throughout consultation, 
and to ensure a project will not be stopped because consultation requirements are not met.   
 The ESA provides for civil and criminal penalties for violations of the Act.  Criminal 
penalties include fines of up to $50,000 per violation or a year imprisonment for knowingly 
violating the take provisions, and fines of up to $25,000 per violation for all other knowing 
violations or up to six months imprisonment (16 U.S.C. §1540(b)).  Civil penalties can be 
required in addition to criminal penalties, and include fines of up to $25,000 per violation for 
knowingly violating the ESA, and fines up to $500 per violation for inadvertent violations of the 
Act (16 U.S.C. §1540(a)) (Herson and Lucks 2008).  The ESA also authorizes injunctions for 
violations of any portion of the Act.  The Law Enforcement Division of USFWS and NOAA 
Fisheries are the primary enforcers of the ESA; however, citizen suits may be brought to enjoin 
violations of the ESA or to compel the enforcing agencies to enforce the Act.  Citizen are 
authorized to bring lawsuits under 16 U.S.C. §1540(g)(1), which allows for “any person to 
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commence a civil suit on his or her own behalf…to enjoin any person, including the United 
States and any other governmental instrumentality or agency…alleged to be in violation of any 
provision of [the ESA]” (Littleworth and Garner 2007). 
 
Central Valley Project and State Water Project 
 
 The Central Valley Project (CVP) and the State Water Project (SWP) are two major 
components of California’s complex water delivery system.  These two projects capture and 
store surface runoff in a number of reservoirs, and transport it throughout the state for a variety 
of purposes using natural and man-made waterways.  The CVP was intended to be a state funded 
project as the initial part of the State Water Plan, but was taken over by the federal government 
during the Great Depression due to a lack of state funding.  The CVP was authorized for 
construction by the Department of the Interior and is owned and operated by the U.S. Bureau of 
Reclamation (USBR), an agency within the Department.  The CVP was made subject to 
reclamation laws, providing that the dams and reservoirs be used for river regulation, 
improvement of navigation, and flood control, irrigation and domestic uses, and power 
(Littleworth and Garner 2007).  Construction began in 1937 and was largely completed in 1951, 
although construction of additional CVP facilities continued into the 1990’s.  The CVP 
encompasses nearly the entire length of the Central Valley, from the Cascade Mountains near 
Redding in the northern Sacramento Valley, to the Tehachapi Mountains near Bakersfield in the 
southern San Joaquin Valley some four hundred miles away.  Approximately nine million acre-
feet of water is managed by the CVP, which is comprised of twenty dams and reservoirs, eleven 
power plants, and five hundred miles of canals.  Seven million acre-feet is delivered annually for 
22 
 
agricultural, urban, and wildlife uses.  The five million acre-feet delivered for farms is enough to 
irrigate three million acres of farmland, approximately one-third of agriculture land in California.  
The CVP delivers about 600,000 acre-feet for municipal and industrial uses, enough for one 
million homes, and generates 5.6 billion kilowatt hours of electricity, enough to meet the needs 
of two million people (Herson and Lucks 2008).   
 The SWP was authorized by the California Water Resources Development Bond Act, 
also called the Burns-Porter Act, in 1959, and approved by the voters in 1960 to issue $1.75 
billion in general obligation bonds (Herson and Lucks 2008).  The SWP is operated by the 
California Department of Water Resources (DWR).  It was designed to help meet future water 
needs by providing supplemental surface water for urban uses to support the growing population 
of southern California and irrigation uses in the Central Valley to prevent groundwater overdraft.  
Twenty-two dams and reservoirs store SWP runoff, which is delivered through many miles of 
canals, including the 444 mile California Aqueduct, which runs from the Delta through the San 
Joaquin Valley and over the Tehachapi Mountains into Southern California.  The San Luis 
Reservoir, an off-stream storage facility near Los Banos, is a joint-use facility for both the SWP 
and CVP, as is the stretch of the California Aqueduct from the San Luis Reservoir to Kettleman 
City. The SWP has the capacity to deliver 4.2 million acre-feet of water, however, deliveries 
average 2.8 million acre-feet.  About thirty percent of SWP water is used for irrigation, mostly in 
the San Joaquin Valley, and seventy percent for residential, municipal, and industrial uses in 
southern California and the Bay Area (Water Education Foundation 2008).   
 USBR and the DWR were issued permits by the state authority that is now the State 
Water Resources Control Board (SWRCB) for appropriative water rights for their respective 
projects over a period of year (U.S. Bureau of Reclamation 1978).  These rights are subject to 
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California water law.  Under California’s system of prior appropriations, users are issued 
licenses or permits for a specific quantity of water to be diverted from a watercourse and put to a 
beneficial use.  The users that gained their water rights first are considered senior appropriators, 
while those who acquired their rights more recently hold junior rights.  In times of drought, 
junior appropriators are the first to bear the burdens of shortage.  Senior rights holders will not be 
deprived of their allotment until all rights junior to theirs have been.   All water in California is 
subject to Article X, Section 2, of the California Constitution, which requires the reasonable and 
beneficial use of water (Water Education Foundation 2005). 
 The water rights to CVP water are held by the USBR.  Some 250 contractors receive 
water from the CVP.  USBR holds contracts with these parties to deliver specified quantities of 
water from the Project.  The contractors may be individuals or water districts, such as Westlands 
Water District, the largest irrigation district in the nation, located in the western San Joaquin 
Valley (Water Education Foundation 2005).  Westlands and other such organizations, which 
contract with USBR for water deliveries, hold contracts with users within their jurisdiction for 
the delivery of specific amounts of water.  In the case of Westlands, these users are farmers who 
put the water to the required beneficial use.  This water is delivered to the user through 
distribution laterals maintained by the District.  DWR delivers water to twenty-nine public 
agency contractors, the largest of which is the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California 
(Littleworth and Garner 2007).  In much the same way that the federal contractors operate, the 
state contractors distribute the project water to users within their jurisdiction.  Like USBR and 
the CVP, the DWR holds the SWP water rights, but is not the user of the water.  
 The contracts between the government agencies and the federal and state contractors 
provide for deliveries of specific amounts of project water.  They also provide for repayment of 
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the costs of the projects.  SWP contractors pay for the entire cost of their share of the project, 
including interest.  In this regard, water users pay for the cost of water storage and conveyance 
elements of the project, and power customers are responsible for portions of the project related to 
power generation.  Elements related to flood control and wildlife enhancement are paid by the 
federal and state governments.  Likewise, the CVP users pay for the water and power related 
portions of their project.  Flood control, wildlife enhancement, and recreation are not 
reimbursable.  This means that roughly eighty to eighty-five percent of CVP costs are 
reimbursable from users (U.S. Bureau of Reclamation 1978).  These costs are still being repaid 
(Water Education Foundation 2008).  
In general, the CVP and SWP distribute surface water from the north to water users in the 
south.  At the heart of both systems is the Delta, where the Sacramento and San Joaquin Rivers 
converge and flow into the San Francisco Bay and out to the Pacific Ocean.  The CVP and SWP 
storage facilities release water that flows down the Sacramento River to the Delta.  Diversions 
are made along the way and from the Delta for users in the Sacramento Valley and Bay Area.  
From the Clifton Court Forebay, a water regulating reservoir in the Delta, water is exported from 
the Delta to users in the San Joaquin Valley and southern California.  The CVP’s C.W. “Bill” 
Jones Pumping Plant lifts water out of the Delta into the Delta-Mendota Canal.  The Canal flows 
south along the west side of the valley to the San Luis Reservoir and its related facilities for 
storage, and then moves east across the valley towards the San Joaquin River, ending at the 
Mendota Pool.  This water replaces supplies to San Joaquin River water users that have been 
disrupted by diversions made upriver at the Friant Dam for the Friant-Kern Canal, which 
services CVP users in the eastern and southern San Joaquin Valley.  The SWP’s Harvey O. 
Banks Pumping Plant pumps water into the California Aqueduct.  It follows the path of the 
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Delta-Mendota Canal to the San Luis Reservoir for storage, and then continues south through the 
valley and into southern California.  The Aqueduct services both CVP and SWP users in the 
western San Joaquin Valley from the San Luis Reservoir until Kettleman City, after which water 
is delivered to SWP users in the southern San Joaquin Valley and southern California 



























Procedure for Data Collection 
 
A claimant believing he or she has suffered a taking of property will present evidence to 
the court supporting that position at each step of the inquiry.  The court determines the facts of 
the case based on the evidence presented, and applies the facts to the takings analysis.  The 
evidence that the claimant presents to the court will support the claims that a property right 
exists, a regulation has affected the property, and the property was so impacted that a per se 
taking, a categorical taking, or a partial Penn Central taking has occurred.   
Before the claimant begins compiling evidence to present to the court, an investigation of 
the situation must first take place.  This investigation is much less detailed than an investigation 
that gathers evidence for a takings claim brought in court, but it does identify the necessary 
components of the claim that direct the second, more detailed investigation.  Essentially, the 
initial investigation examines the situation to determine if there is a reasonable connection 
between a particular impact, a government action, and an effect on property, which is most likely 
observed as an economic impact.  Due to the nature of this investigation, the starting point for 
this process is the ending point of the court’s inquiry.  An economic impact observed by the 
property owner is the factor that will initiate a takings inquiry.  The cause of the economic 
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impact must be linked to a government action, the regulation.  From this point, it must be 
established that the regulation did affect the rights of the property owner, which resulted in the 
economic impact that initiated the process.   
In the case of the California Water Crisis, the components sought by the initial 
investigation have been identified by numerous news articles, press releases, and reports related 
to the situation published since the beginning of the water crisis.  These publications include San 
Joaquin Valley area and agriculture industry newspapers, specifically the Fresno Bee and 
California Farm Bureau’s Ag Alert, press releases from organizations associated with the water 
crisis and government agencies at the county, state, and national level, and related economic, 
scientific, and use reports prepared by many of those same entities.   
The components identified by the various publications will be used to conduct a detailed 
investigation of the water crisis as it applies to Westlands Water District, the subject of the case 
study.  Westlands Water District is an irrigation district that covers 600,000 acres of farmland in 
western Fresno and Kings Counties.  The District provides water deliveries from the CVP to 
approximately six hundred farms, which produce over sixty commodities for an annual 
production of over $1 billion.  Approximately fifty thousand people live in and around 
Westlands.  Many of these people work for Westlands farmers or for businesses directly 
associated with farming (Westlands 2001).  Many of the communities hardest hit by the 







Procedure for Data Analysis 
 
The components of the initial investigation identified for Westlands Water District must 
be applied to the standards for takings inquiries set by the courts.  In a regulatory takings inquiry, 
the court must consider the property rights affected, and determine if the claimant has a right to 
the property.  If no right exists, there is no taking.  If it is found that a regulation has had an 
impact on the claimant’s property rights, the type of taking can be derived from this.  It is likely, 
though not guaranteed, that a denial of the right of exclusion will result in a physical occupation 
taking per se.  It is also likely, though not guaranteed, that a complete denial of the right to use 
property, depriving the owner of all economically beneficial use of the property, will result in a 
categorical taking.  No further inquiry is necessary regarding the degree to which the property 
has been affected; it is considered a total frustration of property rights resulting in a taking of 
property.  If there is less than a complete denial of the right to use property, a partial taking may 
be found using the Penn Central test.  This test considers the economic impact of the regulation, 
the interference with investment-backed expectations, and the character of the government action 
applied to the parcel as a whole.  The permanent or temporary nature of the taking should be 
considered for determining the appropriate amount of compensation to be paid to the affected 
property owner. 
Because the court system uses prior cases as precedents to direct its decisions, it is only 
fitting to use as a guide cases involving similarly situated instances.  The principles and 
reasoning the courts have used to apply the law and takings doctrine to prior cases would likely 
apply to any similarly situated set of facts.  This allows for comparisons to be made between the 
relevant facts of those cases and the Westlands Water District case study, which can indicate 
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how the court will decide a takings case based on the facts of the case study.  The most 
appropriate cases to consider would be recent takings claims involving components similar to 
those identified by the initial investigation.  Such cases can be found in the published general 
jurisdiction opinions of the United States Court of Federal Claims, the court where takings 
claims are filed, as well as decisions from the trial and appellate court systems of California and 




To seek compensation for a taking, a claimant must file an inverse condemnation suit in 
the Court of Federal Claims.  This court and the other courts have dismissed numerous cases on 
the grounds that the case is not yet ripe, meaning it is not yet fit to be heard by the court.  To 
achieve ripeness, the claim must be at a point where it is appropriate for the court to decide on 
the facts.  This means the government agency involved has issued a final opinion after all 
reasonable and prudent alternatives have been considered, and the regulatory appeals process has 
concluded.  Without a final opinion, the elements of the case may change.  For instance, the 
agency may grant a permit for an activity that was previously prohibited.  Ripeness ensures that 
the situation presented will not change, allowing the court to determine the set of facts of the 
case and apply its takings inquiry to that set of facts.  It must be assumed that this case has 
achieved ripeness, making it appropriate to come before the court.  A final decision by the 







The takings inquiry will be limited to a single case study, rather than an examination of 
the entire situation.  This is in an effort to narrow the focus of the examination to a more 
manageable degree.  Westlands Water District will be the case study examined, and is intended 
to be representative of all similarly situated parties.  However, considering the court’s 
requirement for conducting ad hoc, factual inquiries when determining takings, it must be 
recognized that each situation is unique and will likely have a different set of facts associated 
with it.  While Westlands is intended to be representative of the California Water Crisis as a 
whole and the parties affected by it, the Westlands situation and associated facts may not be 
consistent with other water districts.  The Westlands Water District provides irrigation water 
from the CVP to farmers on the west side of the San Joaquin Valley, which may distinguish the 
conditions of this case from cases involving non-agricultural users, as well as SWP users.  For 
this reason, Westlands can be used only as a limited example of the larger situation.  The 
findings of this examination will be only applicable to this case.  Other cases can be applied 


















The California Water Crisis 
 
 The California Water Crisis is the result of a combination of natural drought conditions 
and court imposed restrictions on water exports from the Delta.  Three consecutive dry years 
have depleted reservoirs around the state.  Decreased precipitation and snowpack in the Sierra 
Nevada Mountains has led to decreased runoff in most of the major watersheds of the state.  As a 
result, reservoir levels have dropped significantly.  This prompted Governor Schwarzenegger to 
declare a statewide drought in June of 2008 (E.O. S-06-08).  The past three water years have 
been listed as dry or critically dry, leading to greater uncertainty about the state’s water supply 
(Osugi 2010).   
Hydrologic information is categorized by water years, which begin October 1.  For 
instance, Water Year 2010 began on October 1, 2009, and will end on September 30, 2010.  
Statewide precipitation was sixty-three percent of average in 2007, seventy-two percent of 
average in 2008, and seventy-six percent of average in 2009 (Osugi 2010).  At the end of Water 
Year 2009, the state’s reservoirs were at eighty percent of average storage, which is roughly 
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forty-six percent of capacity.  Key reservoir units were much lower.  Because of the low 
reservoir levels at the end of the water year, carry-over to the next year is much less than in 
normal situations, underscoring the lack of water available for use. 
California’s Drought Update was released April 30, 2010, and provides detailed 
information about the state’s water situation through April 2010.  The winter and spring of Water 
Year 2010 have been much wetter than the years immediately prior.  Precipitation as of March 
2010 was ninety-five percent of average.  As of April 22, 2010, statewide reservoir storage was 
up to ninety-four percent of average (Osugi 2010).  The Sierra Nevada snowpack was measured 
at 143% of average on April 30, 2010, in the last snow survey of the year conducted by DWR 
(Weiser 2010).  However, there is a hesitancy to declare the drought over, despite the abundant 
snowpack, because officials remain uncertain about how much water will runoff into rivers and 
be captured in reservoirs.  As of March 2010 the runoff stood at just sixty-six percent of average 
(Osugi 2010).   
California’s water supply was further jeopardized by the 2007 decision of Natural 
Resource Defense Council v. Kempthorne (2007).  The lawsuit was brought by a number of 
environmental groups in federal court challenging the legality of a biological opinion that 
supports the operation of the CVP and SWP in the Delta (Campbell 2007).  The CVP and SWP 
are coordinately operated by the USBR and the DWR, pursuant to a series of Coordinated 
Operating Agreements between the two agencies.  The Long-Term Central Valley Project and 
State Water Project Operations Criteria and Plan (OCAP) outlines the changing operations of the 
two projects in light of several factors.  Among the changes in operations covered by the OCAP 
were increased rates of water exports from the Delta at the Banks and Jones Pumping Plants.  
Because the operation of the Projects would likely affect protected species in the Delta, Section 
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Seven consultation was required by the ESA.  One such protected species is the Delta smelt, 
which is listed as threatened under the ESA.  This tiny fish can be drawn into the pumping 
facilities and killed, as well as other effects related to water flows and pumping.  The USFWS 
issued a biological opinion on the OCAP in 2004, followed by a revised biological opinion in 
2005.  The biological opinion concluded that the operations of the Projects would not jeopardize 
the continued existence of the Delta smelt or adversely modify its critical habitat, which 
authorized the operation of the pumping facilities and set Delta smelt take limits (NRDC v. 
Kempthorne 2007).      
The environmental groups sued the Department of the Interior and USFWS on the 
grounds that the findings of the biological opinion were arbitrary and capricious and contrary to 
law under the Administrative Procedures Act.  Several parties joined the lawsuit as defendant-
interveners, including DWR, California Farm Bureau Federation, State Water Contractors, and a 
number of water agencies and irrigation districts, including Westlands Water District.  The court 
ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, stating the “no jeopardy” finding was arbitrary, capricious, and 
contrary to law.  Judge Wanger determined the biological opinion was unlawful and inadequate 
for several reasons: it does not provide a reasonable degree of certainty that mitigation actions 
will take place, it fails to utilize the best available scientific information by not addressing data 
related to Delta smelt abundance and the issue of climate change, it fails to consider recent 
species abundance and jeopardy when setting take limits, and it does not adequately consider 
impacts to critical habitat (NRDC v. Kempthorne 2007).    
The invalidation of the biological opinion resulted in a drastic decrease in the rate of 
project pumping from the Delta.  On May 31, 2007, USBR announced its intentions to reduce 
pumping to the minimum level required to maintain human health and safety, while DWR 
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completely stopped pumping operations from its facilities (U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service 2007).  
These measures were undertaken to prevent the take of Delta smelt at the pumps, which is not 
authorized in the absence of a valid biological opinion.  A new biological opinion was issued by 
USFWS on December 15, 2008, which included reasonable and prudent alternatives to the 
proposed operations.  These provisions maintain certain pumping restriction to protect the Delta 
smelt (U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service 2008).  Additionally, a 2008 lawsuit involving many of the 
same parties invalidated the biological opinion issued by NOAA Fisheries for project operations 
affecting salmon and steelhead (Campbell 2008).   Whether ordered by the court or voluntarily 
enacted by USBR or DWR, steps taken to protect threatened fish species have significantly 
affected CVP and SWP operations.   
The combined effect of the court decisions and the drought have crippled California’s 
water supply.  California Drought Response Fact Sheet, published in September of 2009 by 
USBR, reports 1.6 million acre-feet of water that could have been exported south of the Delta 
were lost that year due to drought conditions and 500,000 acre-feet of water were lost due to 
Delta pumping restrictions to protect fish (U.S. Department of the Interior 2009).  DWR 
estimates that agency restrictions on Delta pumping will reduce water deliveries by 600,000 
acre-feet in 2010 (Department of Water Resources 2010 (B)).  Water deliveries to contractors for 
both projects have declined substantially, especially agricultural users.  USBR and DWR 
projected water allocations for contractors are reported throughout the winter and spring.  These 
projections may be updated as hydrologic conditions change.  USBR’s Summary of Water Supply 
Allocations reports the water allocations for contractors in terms of percent of contracted 
amounts.  Allocations for Water Year 2007 were one hundred percent for agricultural contractors 
north of the Delta, but only fifty percent for agricultural contractors south of the Delta.  These 
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allocations were an increase from the earlier projection of thirty-five percent for agricultural 
contractors north and south of the Delta (U.S. Bureau of Reclamation 2010).  In 2008, 
allocations for agricultural contractors were ultimately decreased by five percent to forty percent 
of the contracted amount for contractors north and south of the Delta.  Initial allocations for 
agricultural contractors in 2009 were zero percent of contracted amounts.  Allocations for 
contractors north of the Delta were increased to forty percent, but contractors south of the Delta 
were only allocated ten percent of their contracted amounts.  The Department of the Interior 
announced on April 15, 2010, that agricultural contractors south of the Delta will receive thirty 
percent of contracted amounts for Water Year 2010, which is an increase from the five percent 
allocation that was announced in February (Rodriguez 2010).  The allocation was increased to 
forty percent three weeks later (Grossi 2010).  
SWP allocations for Water Year 2007 were sixty percent of contracted amounts 
(Department of Water Resources 2007).  Allocations for contractors in 2008 were thirty-five 
percent of contracted amounts.  DWR cited dry conditions and the court orders to protect fish 
species in the Delta for the allocated amounts, estimating that allocations would be fifty percent 
in the absence of the court imposed restrictions (Department of Water Resources 2008).  The 
initial allocation for 2009 was set at fifteen percent of contracted amounts, but was later 
increased to forty percent (Department of Water Resources 2009).  Only five percent of 
contracted amounts was initially projected by DWR for 2010 SWP deliveries, but this allocation 
was increased to forty-five percent on May 20, 2010 (Department of Water Resources 2010 (A)).  
The limited deliveries of CVP and SWP water have led to the devastating economic effects in the 
San Joaquin Valley, and compromised the reliability of the water supply for over three million 
acres of farmland and twenty-five million Californians.  
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Case Study of the Westlands Water District 
 
 At issue in this case study is enforcement of the ESA.  Provisions of this law, evidenced 
by federal court orders and requirements of biological opinions, have been causing USBR to 
drastically curtailed water exports from the Delta since 2007.  The steps taken by USBR to 
protect the fish are the type of government action that may result in a taking of property.  There 
is no question that the ESA strives to achieve a legitimate public purpose.  It has been established 
that the Supreme Court’s interpretation of “public use” is synonymous with “public purpose.”  
This law, therefore, fits the criteria of “public use” set forth in the Fifth Amendment.   
An article from the July 8, 2009, issue of the California Farm Bureau Federation 
publication Ag Alert reported losses of $1.4 billion due to water shortages in the San Joaquin 
Valley (Miller 2009).  This figure was derived from projections by agriculture commissioners in 
Fresno, Kern, Kings, Madera, and Tulare counties.  The article also reported the fallowing of 
over 500,000 acres in the five counties.  In 2007 and 2008, nearly 100,000 acres were fallowed 
in Westlands Water District each year.  That number increased to a staggering 242,000 acres in 
2009, which is roughly forty percent of the entire district.  The District expects 170,000 acres to 
remain idle in 2010 (Westlands Water District 2010).  Land left idle and the reported losses to 
the agriculture industry are the indicators of possible frustration of property rights that initiate the 
takings inquiry.  Using land for the production of agricultural crops is a legitimate exercise of a 
property owner’s right to use his or her property.  Although a number of factors could have 
contributed to farmers leaving land fallow, in this instance, a shortage of irrigation water is 
specifically cited.   
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For farmers in the Westlands Water District, irrigation water is delivered from the CVP. 
Westlands holds contracts with USBR for the delivery of 1,150,000 acre-feet of water per year.  
The CVP allocations for Westlands for 2007, 2008, 2009, and 2010 were fifty percent, forty 
percent, ten percent, and forty percent, respectively.  Deliveries for those years were 629,520 
acre-feet in 2007, 332,547 acre-feet in 2008, and 195,716 acre-feet in 2009 (WestlandsWater 
District 2010).  Deliveries for 2010 will likely be similar to those in 2008.  The ten percent 
allocation in 2009 is the lowest allocation in the District’s history.   
The Delta pumping restrictions and the reduced deliveries of project water are the result 
of compliance with federal law.  However, in this instance, the ESA does not impose any 
restrictions on the ability of farmers to use their land.  Here, enforcement of the ESA has, 
through the court rulings and biological opinions, resulted in limited water exports from the 
Delta.  Some farmers continue to grow crops using an increased amount of groundwater.  The 
practice of growing crops on their land is still an acceptable exercise of the property owner’s 
rights to use their property.  Enforcement of the ESA has done nothing to frustrate those rights.  
In this scenario, the government action has merely interfered with the availability of a production 
input.  The actual use of that input on the land is still allowed.  Because the government action at 
issue does not restrict the use of the land, there is no taking of property in regards to land use. 
But land is not the only property at play in this scenario.  Water rights are real property 
rights.  California Water Code §102 states: “All water within the State is property of the people 
of the State, but the right to the use of water may be acquired by appropriation in the manner 
provided by law.”  The California Supreme Court wrote in the case of Eddy v. Simpson (1853) 
that “the right of property in water is usufructuary, and consists not so much in the fluid itself as 
the advantage of its use” (Eddy v. Simpson 1853).  The court described usufructuary rights in 
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terms of a stream flowing across a parcel of land.  The land owner does not own the water 
flowing in the channel, but has the right to reasonably use the water as it passes across the land.  
Simply put, the property interest in water is the right to use that water.  A California Appellate 
Court noted that once rights to use water are acquired, they become vested property rights.  As 
such, they cannot be infringed by others, or taken by government action without due process and 
just compensation (United States v. State Water Resource Control Board 1986).  
It is established that California law requires a water right for the diversion and use of 
water.  It is also established that the right to water is usufructuary, and a real property interest.  
Government actions related to the ESA have interfered with CVP water deliveries to federal 
contractors.  However, the appropriative rights to the project water are held by USBR, which in 
turn contracts with other entities to use the water.  The question now becomes whether or not a 
taking can occur under these circumstances.    
The Court of Federal Claims case of Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District v. United 
States (2001) provides some guidance to this case study.  This case was brought against the 
United States government by state water contractors.  The contractors must bring such a suit, as 
opposed to the farmers who use the water, because of the decision in Orff v. United States 
(2005), which found the end-users were not intended third party beneficiaries to the water 
contracts USBR held with Westlands, meaning they did not have standing to bring a lawsuit 
against the federal government.  The District, which is a contracting party, does have standing to 
bring such a suit.  Therefore, a takings claim must be brought by Westlands Water District, not 
the farmers who are ultimately deprived of water. 
The contractors in the Tulare Lake case claimed their property was taken when the 
government took steps to protect fish living in the Delta, restricting their contractual rights to use 
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project water from 1992 to 1994.  The elements of the Tulare Lake case are very similar to any 
inverse condemnation suit that Westlands might bring.  A distinct difference between the Tulare 
Lake case and a potential Westlands case is the fact that the plaintiffs in Tulare Lake were state 
contractors that receive water from the SWP, while Westlands is a federal contractor that 
receives water from the CVP.  The court considered a number of issues in this case, among them 
whether the contractors had a real property interest based on their water contracts.  
The court determined that the contractors had an identifiable interest in a stipulated 
volume of water.  This is derived from the quantity set forth in the terms of the SWRCB permits 
for the use of water.  The title to water always remains with the State, but the right to the water’s 
use is transferable, first by permit to DRW, and then by contract to the end-users.  The contracts 
between the contractors and DWR confer on the contractors a right to the exclusive use of 
prescribed quantities of water.  The permits held by DWR allow for the diversion of water from 
the Delta, but DWR must contract with other entities for that water to be put to a beneficial use.  
Additionally, the court recognized the contractors’ rights in the water’s use as superior to all 
competing interest, which they deemed a sufficiently matured property interest.  Therefore, the 
real property interest in water, the right to use the water, was passed along to the contractors.  
The contractual agreements between USBR and Westlands provide for a similar transfer of use 
rights, establishing the District’s real property interest in the use of the water delivered from the 
CVP. 
After determining that the state contractors had a property interest in the water, the 
Tulare Lake court considered the nature of the alleged taking.  The court found a taking per se 
resulting from a physical occupation of the property had occurred.  Several cases were cited in 
the opinion in which the government acquired plaintiffs’ water rights so the government could 
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use the water for its own purposes.  The court concluded that restrictions placed on water 
diversions and deliveries for the protection of fish species amounted to the same type of taking.  
The government’s actions to protect the fish required the exclusive possession of the contractors’ 
water-use rights.  Because the right in water is usufructuary, a restriction on use completely 
frustrates the water right itself.  The court determined the government substituted itself as the 
beneficiary of the contractual rights to the water by limiting the contractors’ ability to use an 
amount of water to which they would otherwise be entitled.   
 The court’s final consideration was whether the contractors owned the property for which 
they sought compensation.  The government asserted that the loss of water was non-compensable 
due to background principles of state law which places limits on the title to the property 
transferred to the contractors by their contracts with DWR.  There can be no property right in a 
use that is not permissible by law.  The government argued that the contractors’ use of the water 
that would be received from full contract deliveries would violate the Public Trust Doctrine, the 
Doctrine of Reasonable Use, and Nuisance Law, due to the harm such diversion and use of water 
would cause to fish.  The court did not agree, and found no issue with the proposed use by the 
contractors.  Therefore, there is a legitimate right to use in the title of the property which was 
transferred by DWR to the state contractors.  Westlands would expect the same determination of 
a legitimate right to the use of the water, extending to the District ownership of the water rights 
via the contracts it holds with USBR. 
 The Tulare Lake case was ruled a taking of property by the Court of Federal Claims, but 
a case brought by Westlands Water District cannot expect the same results.  A case of this nature 
brought by Westlands against the federal government would not be found to be a taking.  The 
reason for this is outlined in the Tulare Lake decision, and differentiates that case from a 
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potential Westlands case.  In Tulare Lake, the government argued that the contractors were only 
entitled to water that was made available to DWR for delivery.  A clause in the state contracts,  
Paragraph 18(f), exempts the State and its agents from liability for “any damage, direct or 
indirect, arising from shortages in the amount of water to be made available for delivery to the 
Agency under this contract caused by drought…or any other cause beyond its control” (Tulare 
Lake 2001). The government cited O’Neill v. United States (1995) in support of this position.   
 O’Neill was a breach of contract case brought in federal court by water users within 
Westlands Water District to require the federal government to deliver the full contractual amount 
of the water (O’Neill v. United States 1995).  The government was found to be insulated from 
liability because of a clause in the federal contract similar to that of the state contracts.  The 
Tulare Lake court noted the clause in the federal contracts was applicable to the federal 
government, insulating them from liability, but the state contract was applicable only to the State 
of California and its agents, not the federal government defendants in that case.  If a party 
separate from the State of California limits the water available to DWR for delivery, such as the 
United States government, that party may be held liable for the shortage.  This determination is 
an important aspect of the Tulare Lake case, establishing that the state contractors have fully 
formed contractual rights, with the exception of the liability clause.   
In a case brought by Westlands, the federal government would cite the O’Neill decision 
as a defense against liability.  Article 12(b) of the Long-term Renewal Contract between the 
United States and Westlands Water District states: “If there is a Condition of Shortage because 
of errors in physical operation of the Project, drought, other physical causes beyond the control 
of the Contracting Officer or actions taken by the Contracting Officer to meet legal obligations 
then…no liability shall accrue against the United States or any of its officers, agents, or 
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employees for any damage, direct or indirect, arising therefrom” (U.S. Bureau of Reclamation 
2006).  Unlike the scenario of the Tulare Lake case, in which the federal government had no 
protection from liability, the clause in the federal contract would explicitly insulate the federal 
government from any liability of shortage in a similar claim brought by any federal contractor, 
including Westlands Water District.  This contractual exception limits Westlands’ right to the 
water in such a situation.  The contract does not confer upon the District ownership of the right 
to the use of water not delivered by USBR during times of shortage that result from restrictions 
imposed by the United States government.  For this reason, the reductions in water deliveries to 

























In the presented case study, the reductions in water deliveries from the Delta due to 
enforcement of the Endangered Species Act do not constitute a regulatory taking.  There exists a 
real property interest in the use of water, which is transferred from USBR to the federal 
contractors via the CVP water contracts.  However, Article 12(b) of the Long-term Renewal 
Contract between the United States and Westlands Water District insulates the federal 
government from liability of shortages.  Westlands cannot expect the use of water that the United 
States government does not make available for delivery, and therefore has no ownership of the 
usufructuary rights to water not delivered.  Under these circumstances, there is no ownership of 




 The Court of Federal Claims will rule in favor of the federal government in a takings 
claim brought by the Westlands Water District.  The requirement for ownership necessary for a 
taking to occur is not satisfied.  Knowing that such a claim would not be upheld by the court, it is 
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not in the best interest of the District to pursue this route.  The same is true for any other federal 
contractor whose contract with USBR contains a clause that insulates the federal government 
from liability.  However, this may not be the case for state contractors.  Just as the court ruled in 
the Tulare Lake case, the DWR contracts insulated the state government from liability, but not 
the federal government.  In this case study, the federal government, by the actions of USBR, 
USFWS, and NOAA Fisheries, is responsible for the reductions in water deliveries.  If no 
provision in the state contracts insulates the federal government from liability of shortages, cases 
brought by state contractors may be decided in their favor, based on the findings of the Tulare 





The purpose of a takings investigation is to determine whether or not property owners are 
entitled to compensation as required by the Fifth Amendment.  Compensation could provide 
some degree of financial relief for farmers affected by the California Water Crisis.  But the 
determination that no taking has occurred nullifies the possibility of financial relief for farmers.  
However, a different type of relief is more desirable to more than just farmers.  Having water 
available for irrigating crops would bring hundreds of thousands of acres of fallowed ground 
back into production, provide jobs for thousands of farm workers, and greatly benefit local 
economies.  Restoring normal levels of water deliveries for CVP and SWP users has been the 
primary goal of agricultural and municipal interests since 2007, but the larger goal is a long-term 
solution to provide a reliable water supply for all competing demands.   
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The ESA is one of the strongest environmental laws in the nation because of its 
inflexibility when protected species are affected.  In the case Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill 
(1978), the Supreme Court stated that the “plain intent of Congress…was to halt and reverse the 
trend toward species extinction, whatever the cost.”  At issue were a seemingly insignificant fish 
called the snail darter and the construction of the Tellico Dam.  Construction of the dam would 
threaten the continued existence of the species.  Even though $78 million had already been spent 
on construction, the court ruled that the dam could not be completed.  This was the first major 
challenge to the ESA, and showed the absolute nature of the law. 
 Currently, the fight over California water is taking place in federal court rooms.  Lawsuits 
have been filed by a variety of interested parties arguing all angles on the issue.  The biological 
opinions that affect CVP and SWP operations were invalidated because of lawsuits brought by 
environmental groups.  Armies of lawyers for environmental, agricultural and municipal interests 
have fought almost non-stop over water issues for decades.  The effects legal action will have on 
water deliveries are not known.  What is certain is there will continue to be lawsuits filed almost 
every time a new biological opinion, government action, court ruling or any other significant 
event related to the operations of the CVP and SWP and protected species occurs.   
A May 18, 2010, decision by Judge Wanger found that government officials must 
consider the needs of humans when setting pumping limits and that the science behind NOAA 
Fisheries’ biological opinion did not prove that pumping from the Delta imperiled salmon.  He 
lifted the restrictions on Delta pumping related to the salmon one week later (Ellis 2010 (A)).  
On May 27, 2010, he handed down a similar ruling related to the Delta smelt (Ellis 2010 (B)).  
These decisions will likely be challenged by the government and environmental parties involved 
in the lawsuits. 
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One party may prevail over the other in each court decision, but long-term solutions to 
California’s water woes will not come from a judge’s order.  The staggering number of lawsuits 
that have been filed over the issue in the past decades proves that no real progress can be made in 
court.  In his keynote address to the Madera County Farm Bureau Water Conference in February 
2010, Judge Wanger, speaking as a private citizen, said, “The one place where there can be no 
solution is in the courts” (Adler 2010).  The courts do not make laws, they interpret and apply 
laws.  The inflexible nature of the ESA is reflected in the court rulings, resulting in truly win-
lose outcomes.  But considering the continuous stream of lawsuits and the uncertainty of their 
results, no one really wins.  Court room victories are usually short lived, and do little to achieve 
long-term goals.  The issue must be solved outside of federal courts. 
 The biological opinions issued by USFWS and NOAA Fisheries that cover CVP and 
SWP operations are the real tools that restrict pumping in the Delta, not court orders as some 
might think.  Making changes to the biological opinions and the acceptable operations of the 
projects could provide a means to acquiring more water for farmers.  There are several issues 
with this option.  First, the biological opinions are supposed to be based on the best available 
scientific and commercial data.  These agency decisions cannot be manipulated to benefit one 
party over another.  Priority must be given to the protection of the species, and the biological 
opinions must support that position.  Along those same lines, when agency decisions are 
arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law, or if it is suspected that they are, it is likely a lawsuit 
will be filed to have the decision invalidated.  This is what happened to the Delta smelt 
biological opinion in 2007.  Another reason why reliance on a favorable biological opinion is not 
an effective strategy is because these decisions must be reexamined as conditions change.  The 
conditions that affect the current situation will almost certainly change, as they have changed 
47 
 
before.  Unknown future conditions and how various factors may affect species make for 
uncertain predictions about the future water supply.  If long-term reliability is the goal, this is not 
the right approach.   
There is one possible approach given the current ESA.  In response to the Tennessee 
Valley Authority ruling, Congress amended the ESA.  Congress created the Endangered Species 
Committee, also known as the “God Squad.”  The committee has the authority to grant 
exemptions to Section Seven when “irresolvable conflicts” between species and human activity 
arise (Weston 1993).  The God Squad is chaired by the Secretary of the Interior, and includes as 
members the Secretaries of Agriculture and the Army, the Administrators of the Environmental 
Protection Agency and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the Chairman of 
the Council of Economic Advisors, and one representative from the affected state, who is 
appointed by the President (16 U.S.C. §1536(e)(3)).  An exemption can be granted with the 
approval of five of the seven members of the committee.  The committee must determine, among 
other criteria, that the action being considered for exemption is of regional or national 
significance, the benefits of the action clearly outweigh the benefits of alternative courses of 
action, and it is in the public interest (16 U.S.C. §1536(h)(1)(A)). 
 An exemption is the only recourse allowed by the ESA that may provide relief to the 
California Water Crisis.  The exemption would allow CVP and SWP to operate the Delta pumps 
regardless of the affects to the Delta smelt or salmon or any other protected species, even if such 
actions result in the extinction of the species.  It should be noted that an exemption is required 
for each protected species covered by USFWS and NOAA Fisheries biological opinions related 
to CVP and SWP operations.   
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 A petition was presented to Governor Schwarzenegger in 2009 calling on him to request 
that federal officials convene the God Squad (Richardson 2009).  This will likely not happen.  
Since it was added to the ESA, the God Squad has been called only a handful of times.  One can 
argue that the conflicts surrounding the California Water Crisis between humans and protected 
species are exactly what the God Squad provision of the ESA was designed to address, but the 
political consequences associated with convening the committee are too great for state and 
federal officials.  It is unlikely that elected or appointed officials will risk the backlash of 
environmental interests to even call the committee to meet.  Even if the God Squad is convened, 
it is still very unlikely that an exemption will be granted.  Additionally, problems may arise in 
the future concerning other species, and this process would have to be undertaken again.  This 
can hardly be considered a viable option. 
 Congress does have the power to pass laws that would provide farmers with irrigation 
water.   Congressman Devin Nunes, a Republican who represents California’s 21st Congressional 
District located in the San Joaquin Valley, has introduced legislation to enact a temporary waiver 
of the ESA as it relates to the pumping restrictions (Nunes 2009).  This type of action would be 
similar to a Congressional action taken in 2003 to ensure water availability to the city of 
Albuquerque, New Mexico.  Under this course of action, Congress would specifically identify an 
action as exempt from certain provisions of the ESA, in much the same way as the God Squad 
would.  An act of Congress eventually allowed for the completion of the Tellico Dam when the 
God Squad did not grant an exemption.  But Nunes’ bill, the Turn on the Pumps Act, has been 
met with strong opposition from environmental interests and members of the Democratic Party, 
which currently controls Congress.  Despite his efforts, Congressman Nunes does not have the 
support to pass his bill given the current political climate.   
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Across the aisle, U.S. Senator Diane Feinstein, a Democrat from California, considered 
adding an amendment to an unrelated bill that would mandate water deliveries of forty percent to 
project water users (Doyle and Schultz 2010).  She abandoned that effort when the Department 
of the Interior updated the annual water allocation.  If she had pursued her efforts, Senator 
Feinstein would have been faced with a difficult battle with members of her own party.  This 
shows the contentious nature of water and the environment. 
 Congressman Nunes’ and Senator Feinstein’s bills would provide immediate relief to 
farmers and other water users.  However, the relief would be short-term.  The issue would likely 
have to be revisited in the near future.  Neither bill guarantees long-term reliability of the water 
supply.  Furthermore, acts of Congress such as these would do little to address the larger 
problem: the inflexibility of the ESA.  This problem extends far beyond the California Water 
Crisis, and has affected individuals, businesses, governments, and economic interests since the 
passage of the ESA.  Reform of the ESA as a whole would be the only way to provide long-term 
solutions to human-species conflicts.  The environmental community supports the strict 
requirements of the ESA, but often human beings and their livelihoods are harmed because the 
ESA is only concerned about species preservation.  There is no consideration for the needs of 
humans or economic impacts under the current ESA.  Provisions that allow, or require, USFWS 
and NOAA Fisheries to consider the impacts on humans, communities, and the economy when 
making decisions concerning protected species would strive to lessen the impacts the ESA has on 
those interests.   
Additionally, because the ESA necessarily requires restrictions of land use to protect 
species and their habitat, property owners view them as liabilities rather than assets.  Finding a 
protected species on one’s land is a major concern for property owners, causing them to take 
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steps to discourage and exclude species from their land.  Discovery of a protected species is 
viewed as a penalty, and property owners have a greater incentive to eliminate potential habitat 
for species.  This brings property interests and species preservation into direct conflict.  
Providing incentives for property owners to promote species habitat, and compensating affected 
property owners would ensure protection from economic damages associated with use 
restrictions and enhance the critical habitat necessary for species preservation and recovery. 
Adjusting the incentives for property owners to preserve rather than eliminate species 
habitat and requiring the consideration of human needs are two much needed reforms to the 
ESA.  But ESA reform, like many other contentious issues, has the public divided, politicians 
and special interests fighting, and no foreseeable compromise.  Reforms like those suggested 
would play a part in improving the perception some have of the ESA.  Much work is needed 
from the environmental, business, scientific, and political players to achieve this goal.  However, 
reforming the ESA is necessary to resolve the present conflict between people and species.  ESA 
reform is necessary to prevent future disasters like the California Water Crisis.   
 The marvel of California’s water system has been its ability to move large quantities of 
water from areas of abundance to areas of scarcity.  This has benefitted the northern region by 
regulating river flows to prevent flooding, as well as the southern region by providing a vital 
resource, which has allowed the population and agricultural output of southern and central 
California to soar.  The CVP and SWP were constructed not only to meet the demand for water 
at the time, but to ensure a reliable water supply for California’s future demand.  However, there 
have not been any significant improvements to California’s water storage and conveyance 
infrastructure in decades, while the population has increased substantially.  When the last major 
state-built water storage projects were completed in the late 1970’s, California’s population was 
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roughly 22 million.  The population today is about 38 million, and that number is expected to 
increase to 46 million by the year 2030 (Campbell 2008).  This will continue to strain an already 
tight water supply.  It is important to seek out methods to conserve water and use what is 
available more efficiently, but making more water available for residential, agricultural, and 
environmental uses is equally important.  Investments in infrastructure need to be made to 
provide for current and future needs. 
 A special session of the California Legislature was called in the fall of 2009 by Governor 
Schwarzenegger.  The purpose of this session was to address the issues surrounding California’s 
water supply and finding long-term solutions to those problems.  The 2009 Comprehensive 
Water Package was approved by the Legislature and signed by the Governor in November.  
Consisting of four policy bills and a bond measure, the package is intended to ensure a reliable 
water supply for future generations and restore the Delta and other ecologically sensitive areas 
(Department of Water Resources 2009).  The first bill concerns governance in the Delta and 
establishes the Delta Stewardship Council.  This group is to develop a Delta Plan focused on the 
co-equal goals of Delta restoration and water supply reliability.  The bill also contains 
requirements for other governmental entities that affect the Delta, and provides for the 
furtherance of the co-equal goals.  Lastly, this bill appropriates funding for the Two-Gates Fish 
Protection Demonstration Program, which is a project intended to provide protection for 
sensitive species and manage the water supply.  The second bill requires local agencies to 
monitor the elevation of groundwater basins in an effort to better manage those resources.  The 
third bill sets a statewide water conservation goal of reducing per capita water consumption 
twenty percent by 2020.  This bill also requires the development of agricultural water 
management plans and reporting on water efficiency measures.  The fourth bill requires reporting 
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of water diversions and use in the Delta.  This bill also appropriates $546 million for the 
development of and improvements to Delta management plans and infrastructure.   
 The final element of the 2009 Comprehensive Water Package is a bond measure that will 
be on the November, 2010, ballot for voter approval.  The Safe, Clean, and Reliable Drinking 
Water Supply Act of 2010 is an $11.14 billion general obligation bond proposal.  It would 
provide funding for infrastructure, projects, and programs to address California’s ecosystem and 
water supply issues.  The bond consists of seven categories: drought relief, water supply 
reliability, Delta sustainability, statewide water system operational improvement, conservation 
and watershed protection, groundwater protection and water quality, and water recycling and 
water conservation.  These areas in conjunction are intended to provide improvements to 
California’s water system, develop surface and groundwater storage to increase the available 
water supply, implement conservation and recycling programs, and restore sensitive ecosystems.  
The combination of the policy bills and the bond measure make the 2009 Comprehensive Water 
Package the best option for achieving a long-term solution to provide a reliable water supply for 
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